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Cyberwar and Customary International Law: The
Potential of a "Bottom-up" Approach to an
International Law of Information Operations
Jon P. Jurich*
I. INTRODUCTION
After Estonia relocated a Soviet World War I1 memorial in late April 2007,
the country fell prey to a series of distributed attacks which suddenly jammed
and disabled various websites by overcrowding the bandwidths for the servers
running the sites.' Among the servers targeted were those hosting the websites
of the Estonian president, major Estonian news agencies, government
ministries, and two of the country's largest banks.2 Attempts to trace some early
attacks revealed that at least some of the attacks had Russian origins and were
alleged to have emanated from Russian state institutions. 3 The attacks seemed to
pour in from around the globe, however, making Estonian assertions of
culpability hard to prove.'
"Cyberwarfare," as these attacks were described, represents the emerging
use of the internet to disrupt national security as cyberspace has become better
developed and increasingly accessible to all parts of the world. The breadth of
the attacks against Estonia, however, highlights the scope of modern
technological vulnerability: attacked websites included a broad range of
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Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cybenvar to Disable Estonia, Guardian HP1
19 (May 17,
2007), available online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html>
(visited Apr 5, 2008). Such attacks are commonly known as distributed denial of service attacks
and are characterized by overt attempts to deny services to their legitimate users. Id at 18.
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Id at

19.
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important networks affecting government, civil information, and financial
markets, all institutions which underpin modern life.
The global community's increasing reliance on information technologies
has highlighted the need for governing laws for these new and evolving
technologies that are being adopted at an increasingly rapid pace. Such law,
however, has come in fits and starts, limited by a lack of universal accord
governing these technologies, a disparity in national regulations, and questions
of national sovereignty.
At the same time, commentators have called into question the longstanding
traditional view that customary international law is formed exclusively by states'
acts and beliefs.5 The challenge to this traditional understanding, which includes
an attack on the consensualist conception of international law,' suggests a
potential alternative framework by which to structure an international law
governing cyberwar. This Development undertakes an analysis of this realist
perspective on customary international law formation and highlights the
advantages and disadvantages that relate to its application to the issue of an
international law governing cyberwarfare.
Section II of this Development explores the various definitions of
cyberwar, information operations, information warfare, and cybercrime. This
exploration attempts to create a stable ground that accounts for widening
dependence on network technologies, the challenges in separating their military
and nonmilitary uses, and the threats and opportunities which result from their
use. Section III examines how current law governs the use of these technologies
and identifies the areas in which existing law struggles to meet the challenges of
the emerging technologies and their users. Section IV analyzes the realist
perspective of customary international law and its reflections in developing
international law and considers the possibility that a nonstate-based governing
law of cyberwar could emerge.
II. INFORMATION OPERATIONS, INFORMATION
WARFARE, AND CYBERCRIME
Analyzing cyberwar requires defining the relevant terminology. Broadly
defined, information operations ("10") includes offensive and defensive actions
that attack or protect information systems! Information systems here include

5

Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary InternationalLaw Formation,48 Va J Intl L 119, 122

(2007).
6

See id at 159.

7

Michael N. Schmitt, ConputerNetwork Attack and the Use of Force in InternationalLaw: Thoughts on a
Normative Framework, 37 Colum J Transnad L 885, 890 (1999). Offensive actions would be similar
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the infrastructure, components, organizations, and personnel that deal with
information.8 The inclusion of infrastructure and personnel makes the 1O
definition overly broad when developing an international law for actions solely
within the networked world. Attacks against or damage to the infrastructure and
its personnel can largely be addressed by existing laws, as those laws already
prevent actors from committing crimes against property.9 A new law only needs
to address a narrower portion of information operations.
The US Air Force definition of information warfare ("IW"), concentrated
on the denial, exploitation, corruption, and destruction of information within
information systems (or on preventing such an event), helps limit the scope of
the inquiry.1 ° This definition focuses on the types of attacks that alter
information within the system but do not visibly change the physical entities
which provide the information (such as a server)., This definition does not limit
the physical effects which could occur outside of the information system as a
result of the attack, 12 but distinguishes neatly between the types of attack already
governed by existing laws and this new, more concerning variety. To illustrate,
the destruction of a computer or its hard drive is governed by an easily
applicable law; the alteration of the contents of its hard drive, or of its ability to
access a larger network without actually damaging the physical components of
the computer, poses a more difficult question. IW also has two subsets; one
form of 1W involves misinforming an opponent, while another, the computer

to the attacks on Estonia, while defensive 1O includes network security actions including
implementing firewalls, passwords, and encryption.
8

Id (quoting Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-13, Joint DoctrineforInformation Operations GL-7 (Oct
9, 1998)); see also Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-13, Information Operations I-1(Feb 13, 2006),
available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/newpubs/jp3_13.pdf> (visited Apr 5,
2006).

9

This point holds true particularly given the intertwining of military and nonmilitary uses that
makes almost any information systems infrastructure part of the military. See US v Kabat, 797 F2d
580 (8th Cir 1986).
Mark R. Shulman, Note, Discriminationin the Laws of Informalion Wa fare, 37 Colum J Transnatl L

10

939, 943-44 (1999) (quoting Dept of the Air Force ("USAF'), CornerstonesofInformaion Warfare 34 (USAF 1995)).
11

12

Id at 947 (quoting Office of the Judge Advocate General, Headquarters USAF, Primer on Legal
Issues in Information Operations 14 (USAF, draft 3d ed, Oct 1997)). Note that this definition has
narrower limits than the definition of computer network attacks, which are "[o]perations to
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or
the computers and networks themselves." Schmitr, 37 Colum J Transnatl L at 888 (cited in note
7) (quoting Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrinefor Information Operations GL-5 (Oct
9, 1998)).
For example, a terrorist altering data in an air traffic control computer could produce significant
physical consequences, but could do so without making any change to the physical equipment
providing the controller with information.
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network attack ("CNA"), more actively destroys or alters the opponent's
information.
Even within the limited scope of attacks on information, cyberspace's
many uses-and an increasing global reliance on the application of these usesleaves myriad potential methods available to attackers. The intertwined nature of
cyberspace's infrastructure places military, government, financial, and civilian
uses into a single channel. Within this channel, technological breakthroughs
create vulnerabilities for all users, who are open to opponents' exploitation.
These opponents may range from economic, political, and military competitors
to terrorists and criminals. 3 Each technological breakthrough, moreover, opens
all users of the infrastructure to attacks from any individual opponent.
Meanwhile, opponents can develop offensive strategies against a variety of
targets simultaneously because of a shared protocol within the infrastructure.
Despite this growing threat, leading nations continue to evolve toward a
greater reliance on information systems. The Chinese government has
committed itself to developing an "informationalized" army, comprised of
individuals manning computer terminals instead of tanks, to replace current
"mechanized" technology, 14 and the US Department of Defense ("DOD") uses
over two million computers and more than ten thousand local area networks," s
most of which are linked to, and vulnerable to attack from, users of the larger
internet. The push towards greater reliance on information technologies in fields
including energy, communications, industry, finance, transportation, and human
services 6 has produced a situation in which economic collapse could occur even
if only the financial components of the information systems were crippled; a
more widespread attack could lead to an even greater disaster."
In conjunction with a wide array of targets, the nature of the cybersphere
creates a host of potential attackers. Some consensus exists that the world's
13

Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnatl L at 888 (cited in note 7).

14

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China'sNationalDefense

15

in 2004 (excerptonl), Practice and Document, 4 Chinese J Ind L 699, 700 (2005).
Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnatl L at 887 (cited in note 7).

16

Id at 894-95.

17

Philip M. Romero, An Immunological Approach to Counter-Terrorism and Infrastructure Defense Law in
Electronic Domains, 14 IntlJ L & Info Tech 101, 103 (2006). Romero also notes that
no clearer vulnerability can exist than the United States Federal Reserve going
online. The Fed has decided to allow the nation's money supply to move
almost entirely over the Internet. The old system for transferring US dollars
safely, Fedwire, was a closed network that was not attached to the internet,
moving about $1.8 trillion a day, and averaging $3.5 million per transaction.
FedLine, the new system, is Internet based, and is expected to move even
larger amounts.
Id at 128.
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major powers are unlikely to engage in offensive direct conflicts with each other
by either traditional means or IW."s In a world with established military and
economic disparities, however, emerging nations and nonstate actors that make
traditional attempts to harm a dominant adversary will likely compete
asymmetrically,19 making the use of 1W more attractive to less well-heeled
combatants. Estimates suggest that ten individuals with $10,000 could cause a
several week-long disruption of the US defense information infrastructure, while
one hundred individuals with $30,000,000 could so thoroughly corrupt the
country's entire information infrastructure that recovery could take years.20 In
either scenario, the costs to the perpetrators are significantly lower than those
associated with engaging in a traditional attack.2 Perhaps more importantly,
estimates predicted that nineteen million individuals would know how to launch
cyberattacks in 2002,22 making it likely that at the current time many more
individuals will have acquired the knowledge and capability. It is now clear an
elite hacker community exists and that the capabilities for IW are available to
various individuals and nations, with the minimal entry requirement that the
attacker have internet access.23 Attackers also gain an advantage when using IW
because
assaults
can be
routed
through innocent
intermediary
24
telecommunications systems, making it extremely difficult to trace the effects
back to the actual assailant. 25 This potential anonymity may increase the
attractiveness of IW to a group looking to attack asymmetrically.
Even when the resulting harm clearly qualifies as a serious attack and the
attacker can be identified, separating cybercrime from IW actions can be
difficult. Because a given IW attack can be ascribed to any of a large number of
potential originators, victims will need to determine if an attack can be attributed

18

Schmitt, 37 ColumJ Transnad L at 897 (cited in note 7).

19

Id.

20

Id at 898.

21

22

Id. See also Jennifer J. Rho, Comment, Blackbeards of the Twenty-First Centugy: Holding Cyberciminals
Liable under the Alien Tort Statute, 7 Chi J Intl Law 695, 695 (2007) (noting that cybercriminals need
only satellite phones, battery power, and computer access).
Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnad L at 898 (cited in note 7).

23

Romero, 14 Intl J L & Info Tech at 104 (cited in note 17) (quoting Anderson, et al, Securing the

24

U.S. Defense Information Infrastructure:A ProposedApproach 7 (RAND 1999)).
Shulman, 37 Colum J Transnad L at 947-48 (cited in note 10).

25

In order to provide the most efficient use of resources, servers will generally automatically route
information through network channels to avoid overloading any given server. A casual internet
user, then, may be in the US, requesting information from a server in France, having that
information routed through any number of other servers en route. Because of this process, it can
be difficult to trace a request all the way back to its source, particularly if the signal has been
deliberately routed through a variety of servers around the world.
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to the State that governs the origin point.26 Tied up in this inquiry are
determinations of whether the attack would constitute an act of war between
states or a criminal attack. Michael Schmitt, a prominent scholar on the subject,
limits the definition of 1W to actions taken during times of crisis against specific
opponents,27 while reserving the concept of cybercrime for peacetime acts.
However, with the prospect that a CNA could occur suddenly not as an isolated
incident but as a precursor to a more serious attack, 8 Professor Schmitt's
distinction may not adequately serve our goal of distinguishing cybercrime and
1W actions. Particularly in the long shadows of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing
(and continuing) "global war against terror," the distinction becomes less clear.
The lack of such a distinction, however, might also be useful because it requires
that all potential attacks and attackers be confronted as equal risks.
III. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS CHALLENGES IN
THE CYBER WORLD
Current international laws, including the UN Charter, the protocols of the
Geneva Convention, and existing multilateral treaties, attempt to govern the
applications of 1W and to limit its use. They do not, however, impose a ban on
weapons designed to disrupt electronic communications. 29 The lack of such a
prohibition reflects an uncertainty in how to define international cybercrimes
separately from IW, as well as an uncertainty about IW's potential value.
A. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
Existing international law in the area of cybercrime falls under three main
umbrellas: the UN Charter, the Law of Armed Conflict ("LOAC"), and the
Convention on Cybercrime. The UN Charter provides baseline law for interstate
aggression, but is limited to considerations about force, which may not apply to
cyberwarfare. LOAC conventions govern acts during wartime. The Convention
on Cybercrime ("Convention") is a multilateral treaty that specifically addresses
computer-related crime. However, the Convention gives states great flexibility in
how they punish criminals.

26

Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Self-Defense against ComputerNetwork Attack under InternalionalLaw, 76 Intl

27

L Stud 121, 122 (2002).
Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnad L at 891 (cited in note 7).

28

Robertson, 76 Intl L Stud at 141 (cited in note 26).

29

Roger D. Scott, LegalAxpects of Information Warfare:Militagy Disruption of Telecommunications, 45 Naval
L Rev 57, 58 (1998).
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1. The UN Charter
The UN Charter provides a baseline law for interstate aggression. Article
2(4) limits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent" with UN
purposes, 30 one of which is the maintenance of international peace and
security. 31 It is important to note, however, that although the UN has since
clearly defined that aggression3 2 always constitutes a breach of the peace, it does
not follow that a threat to the peace will always constitute aggression.33 In this
context, peace is defined as the absence of the use of force; the lack of an
inquiry into the legitimacy of other types of threats to peace highlights the
weakness of such a limited definition.34
The Charter's Article 2(4) limitation does come with exceptions. Article 51
preserves "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 35
This right of self-defense is restricted to responses to "armed attack"; permitted
behavior under this restriction would be narrower than the "use of force"
forbidden by Article 2(4).36 As such, a nation could suffer a use of force that
does not qualify as "armed attack" and be forbidden the right of aggressive selfdefense.
Acceptable self-defense under Article 51 usually takes two forms: reprisal
and retorsion.
Acts of reprisal are actions that would, outside of a specific three-step
process, be deemed illegal under the UN Charter. Justified state reprisals require
(1)an assailant's illegal act, followed by (2) the assailant refusing to satisfy (3) the
victim state's demand for redress. 37 Retorsions generally consist of unfriendly
but legal acts of retaliatory or coercive force.38 It is important to note that a

4.

30

United Nations Charter, art 2,

31

Id, art 1,

32

General Assembly Res No 3314, UN Doc A/RES/3314 (1974) (defining aggression as "the use

1. See also Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnal L at 900 (cited in note 7).

of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations").
33

See Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnatl L at 925-26 (cited in note 7).

34

Id at 926.

35
36

United Nations Charter, art 51.
Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnad L at 928 (cited in note 7).

37

Shulman, 37 Colum J Transnad L at 950 (cited in note 10).

38

Id.
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retorsion does not require an aggressive provocation.39 A retorsion in the IW
context would be limited to responding against the system thought to be
generating the attack. Power and telecommunications grids attached to the
system would thus be off limits, 40 and action targeting those systems is likely to
fall more firmly under the zone of reprisal (assuming a demand for redress has
been refused).
2. The Law of Armed Conflict
LOAC conventions 41 govern the conduct of combatants during wartime,
limiting acceptable attacks to military objectives.42 This LOAC restriction
extends to the application of any offensive military capability and should extend
as well to CNAs and other IW techniques. 43 As might be expected in the CNA
and IW context, however, some commentators argue that these weapons could
legitimately target any militarily-related telecommunications because of the
difficulty in separating military from nonmilitary uses of the technology.'
LOAC also requires that combatants afford noncombatants special
consideration. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions ("Protocol I") requires
that "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. 4 5
Protocol I also prohibits causing widespread, long-term damage to the
environment, the starvation of civilians, and directing attacks against works and
installations that "may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population."4 6

39

40
41

42

43
44
45

46

See id at 950 (noting the possibility of retorsion against parties without reasonable expectation to
be punishing the actual perpetrators of the aggressive act).
Id at 951.
The LOAC conventions are a combination of treaties and customary international law, and they
pull on scattered portions of the Geneva Conventions. For an example, see US Department of
Defense, Directive 2311.01E (May 9, 2006), available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/231 101p.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
Scott, 45 Naval L Rev at 59 (cited in note 29).
Id.
See id.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art 48, 1125 UN Treaty Ser 3 (1979)
("Protocol I").
Id at arts 54-56.
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3. The Convention on Cybercrime
The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime ("Convention")
represents the only legally binding multilateral instrument specifically addressing
computer-related crime," advancing, "as a matter of priority, a common criminal
policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime." 4 The Convention
gives special attention to offenses including copyright infringement, computerrelated fraud, child pornography, and offenses related to breaches of network
security.49 The Convention, which has been signed by forty-three states and
ratified by sixteen, also begins to shift the focus from punishing offenders to
detecting and preventing computer crimes.50 For example, Chapter II, section l's
five substantive enumerated tides address protecting computer data and
systems,5 ' computer-related fraud and forgery,52 content-related offenses, 3
4
copyright infringement, and aiding and abetting.1
In addition to establishing clear substantive offenses, the Convention
employs flexible standards and relies on international cooperation to provide a
starting point for addressing these offenses with criminal laws. The Convention
achieves this step through its balance of mandatory and permissive language.
Although the substantive provisions contain clear directives that parties to the
agreement "shall adopt" laws to criminalize the behavior, 6 the Convention
provides for flexible interpretation of what the exact wording of those laws may
be in two ways. First, it leaves to each party the determination of "legislative and
other measures as may be necessary" to effect the necessary correct level of
deterrence. 7 Moreover, the exact requirements of the crimes are left to the
US Department of State, United States Joins Coundlof Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2 (Sept 29,
2006), available online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/73353.htm> (visited Apr 5,
2008).
48 Convention on Cybercrime (2001), Preamble, 41 ILM 282, 282 (2002).
49
Romero, 14 IndJ L & Info Tech at 126 (cited in note 17).
50
Id.
51
Convention on Cybercrime, arts 2-6 (cited in note 48). Tide 1 lists as violations the illegal
accessing of computer systems (art 2), interception without right of nonpublic transmissions (art
3), data interference (art 4), the intentional hindering of a computer system's functionality (art 5),
and creating or using devices which commit acts banned in Articles 2-5 (art 6).
52
Id, art 7-8. Tide 2 addresses computer-related fraud (art 8) and the related offense of computerrelated forgery (art 7).
53
Id, art 9. Title 3 addresses content-related offenses, specifically child pornography.
47

54

Id, art 10.

55

Id, art 11.
See, for example, id, arts 2-6.

56
57

Id, arts 2-13. Each substantive Article of the Convention begins with the phrase, "Each party
shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary ......
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signatories as well; in the case of illegal interception, for example, each country
"may require that the offence be committed with dishonest intent, or in relation
to a computer system connected to another computer system."58 The
Convention also gives signatories incredible leeway in setting punishment,
holding only that sanctions be "effective, proportionate and dissuasive," without
even requiring that the sanctions be criminal.5 9 The Convention also
acknowledges "international co-operation" as its means of enforcing interterritorial crimes.6" These flexible definitions allow the signatories to develop
laws that reflect unique cultural preferences regarding criminality and
punishment, while also establishing a baseline for the included offenses. Such an
alignment provides a useful starting point for addressing these acts criminally
(and expanding the scope of deterrence beyond the private civil suits allowed by
Sosa v AlvareZ-Machain61), but at the same time it seems likely that these varying
standards will not be enforced as readily as a new international law could.
B. CHALLENGES TO THE EXISTING LAW
The unique nature of IW raises special challenges to the existing law
described above because of IW's many forms and potential practitioners.
Combined with the wide variety of beliefs that motivate the legislative bodies
responsible for establishing a governing structure, W's natural variety has led to
calls for a new normative framework.6 2 1W's varied forms and outcomes pose
particularly significant problems for attempts to expand the current law to
include IW.These problems include questions about how the "use of force"
provisions in the UN Charter apply to IW and how definitions of the physical
world translate to acts committed in a world with its own unique constraints on
action, as well as general uncertainty about what constitutes a legal military use
of IW (an area in which extension by analogy has proven particularly fruitless).
1. On IW,the Use of Force, and the UN Charter
The first problem in applying existing law to 1W arises because the baseline
for determining the legality of aggressive action, the UN Charter and its use of
force provisions, does not clearly address IW. The very nature of the attacks at
issue, in fact, raises the question of whether certain types of IW will ever qualify

58

Id, art 3.

59

Id, art 13.

60

Id, art 23.

61

Sosa vAlvareZ-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) (holding that federal courts can hear certain tort claims

62

of international law violations regardless of where they arose).
See Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnad L at 934 (cited in note 7).
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as "use of force" under a conventional understanding of the term. 63 The
language of Article 2(4) aggravates the confusion by prohibiting only "armed
force." Other portions of the Charter refer without qualification to "force" and
have been construed to allow certain types of pressure to be exerted without
violating the armed force prohibition clause.64 While economic and political
coercion might constitute threats to international stability without amounting to
a use of force, such a distinction does not provide any guidance in determining
the legality of an act of IW that has no physical effects. This ambiguity is
problematic because the use-of-force standard's "armed force" measurement has
traditionally separated lesser threats to international stability from redressable
acts, 6' and IW without physical effects would thus seem hard to identify on the
traditional measurement. Some commentators have argued, however, that IW
can in certain circumstances present the type of threat typically associated with
an act of armed force (despite only interfering with communications) by
amounting to a type of coercion specifically sanctioned by Article 41 of the UN
Charter.66
In addition to failing to provide a clear test to measure the legality of IW,
the multiple forms and potential assailants who could engage in 1W make
measuring the threshold criteria more difficult. An attack that is rapidly and
remotely initiated by one individual, or a small group of individuals scattered
throughout the world, may not clearly qualify as a use of force under the
Charter.6' Assailants' ability to initiate attacks with an initial degree of anonymity
adds to the problem that they may be both remotely located and dispersed in
multiple locales. Even if the attack created results that clearly violated the armed
force prohibitions of the UN Charter, a victim would be hard pressed to use
justified self-defense under Article 51 because of an inability to identify the
assailants. This challenge has led some commentators to argue for a looser
reading of Article 51 that allows for anticipatory self-defense against IW.68 This

63

Id at 904.

64

For a general discussion, see id at 906.

65

Id at 904.

66

Robertson, 76 Intl L Stud at 137-38 (cited in note 26) (arguing that Article 41 is not fully
preclusive of categorizing CNA as armed force, but in doing so relies on the assertion that "the
Icomplete or partial interruption' of [computer networks controlling vital societal functions or
critical national-security functions] would have a much more drastic effect than anything that
could have been envisaged by the framers of the Charter in 1945").

67

Id at 122.

68

For a general discussion, see id; see also Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., CberSpace and the Use of Force 130
(Aegis Research 1999) for a discussion of the inquiry into the necessary hostile intent to justify
retaliatory action. Such actions, however, could include shutting down servers suspected of
hosting the attack.
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debate clarifies the problems IW poses to the'existing law contained in the UN
Charter: the uncertainty of how to classify 1W in regard to the conventional
framework makes attempts to apply the laws of that framework an almost
Sisyphean task.
2. Military Application and Uncertainty
One result of any eventual IW law will be to provide military officers with
a clear understanding of when the use of IW is legally acceptable and how those
attacks should be conducted and targeted to avoid violating LOAC principles.
Unfortunately, existing law does not provide such certainty. IW provides a finely
discriminating tool to combatants that may aid in protecting innocent lives and
minimizing the collateral damage of military operations.69 This capability argues
against an outright ban on IW and weighs against other rules that run the risk of
being overbroad.
With the process of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate
weapons growing more difficult,"° muddled rules could lead to military decisions
underutilizing IW, increasing the social costs of the altercation. The difficulty in
establishing the difference between a combatant and a noncombatant also
increases, as any individual with computer access could suddenly become a
potential combatant. IW reprisals over electronic networks could inadvertently
target innocent noncombatants, and fear of reprisal for illegal action could
incentivize commanders to replace IW methods with costlier conventional
techniques. Rather than failing to discriminate between combatants and
noncombatants, militaries could expend increased resources in tracking and
neutralizing enemy combatants via conventional means.
3. Natural Properties of Cyberspace and Existing Law's Failure to
Provide for Them
The challenges highlighted in applying UN Charter law to IW hint at a
broader problem, namely that information technology operates according to a
separate set of constraints than the ones governing traditional kinetic action.
Existing law assumes that actions will be bound by the physical constraints of
time and space, and perhaps more importantly assumes that the consequences of
any action will manifest themselves via a physical effect on other objects within

69

70

For example, temporarily disabling a power grid via CNA will lower reconstruction costs in
comparison to the destruction of the grid or power plant via traditional weapons. See Shulman, 37
Colum Transnatl L at 942-43 (cited in note 10).
Id at 940.
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these assumed boundaries.7' IW, however, presents an area in which these
assumptions, while not assuredly false, do not remain perpetually true.
The move to cyberspace creates a new balance of power. Conventional
symbols of strength, whether economic, military, or diplomatic, do not operate
as readily when physical power is effectively useless. In many instances, the sheer
force of numbers is equally irrelevant to deciding which of two combatants has
the upper hand in a cyberspace conflict. An organization with no hope of
effecting a change in the traditional, physical world can create an entirely level
playing field in this new terrain. Perhaps more importantly, constantly improving
technology may make it possible for an individual to establish parity with a
traditional superpower.7 2 Existing law struggles to take into account this vision
of power because to do so would require affording to every individual a level of
deference traditionally reserved for the state, without any recourse to visible
boundaries or characteristics. Rather than transacting with one or several states
or the inhabitants of a physical region, cyberspace allows groups to form based
on ideology, interest, or to not form at all, leaving an individual to act selfinterestedly but with the potential power traditionally reserved for a state.
This shift is important because it draws out the problems of governing
behavior that has been traditionally restricted to one set of actors (states) in
limited circumstances (war), but which is now almost fully accessible to anyone.
Conventional war involves conflict between states acting on behalf of the
interests of geographically identifiable groups. Furthermore, during war, states
and their agents are authorized to engage in behavior that would be prohibited
under other circumstances. In the process of translating acceptable behavior to
the altered power dynamic of the cybersphere, however, this understanding
would require affording the privileges of states at war to any actor involved in
the conflict. This extension would be done without a clear understanding of
which acts would be legal, however, because certain acts may not carry results
which would trigger the justification of conventional laws.
The disconnect between the traditional worldview and the potential
translations to the cybersphere highlights the weakness of the Convention on
Cybercrime. The need for some level of standardized international law
governing these crimes has been established, but the problem remains of
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Rho, 7 Chi J Intl L at 706 (cited in note 21).
While it is unlikely that a lone individual would take on the US, the fact remains that individuals
creating viruses have caused immense damage without assistance, and could, at least formally,
create such a scenario. Moreover, because the individual could be anywhere in the world,
traditional remedies may be unavailable to the US or another victim state. See note 73 for such an
example.
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drawing the line between individuals operating as criminals and individuals
operating as combatants.
The "I Love You" virus highlights the potential problems the Convention
fails to address.73 Unleashed by hackers in the Philippines, the "I Love You"
virus caused infected computers to send e-mails to all the contacts in the
computer's hard drive. The virus then repeated the process when recipients
opened the file. The aggregate economic damage from the virus was estimated at
between ten and eleven billion dollars.74 Analyzing the situation that surrounded
the "I Love You" virus under three alternative situations provides a firmer idea
of how the Convention struggles in application to deter illegal IW.
Assume all of the following three scenarios take place in a fully compliant
signatory of the Convention. In the first situation, the virus is created and
disseminated by an individual. In the second, the perpetrators are a group
composed entirely of citizens acting entirely within the territory of one state. In
the third, the group is made up of citizens of multiple nationalities, and only the
creator, and not the individuals who actually unleashed the virus, resides in or is
present in the state. In this situation, it may be that the rest of the group is
spread throughout a variety of both signatory and nonsignatory states, making
chances slim that the remainder of the group can be identified and tracked down
even within the signatory states.
While the Convention clearly covers the first two scenarios" and provides
a criminal remedy against the individuals, there remains the chance for
complications. Separate nations may disagree on the appropriate nature of
punishment or what constitutes the "dishonest intent" required by the
Convention. In such an eventuality, while a form of justice may be reached,
there is no guarantee that the outcome will provide any greater satisfaction than
what happened with the "I Love You" virus. The third example raises a host of
complications, and the Convention falls back on "international cooperation" as
73

Jason A. Cody, Derailing the Digitally Depraved: An International Law & Economics Approach to
Combating Cybercrime & Cyberterrorism,11 Mich St U Det Coil LJ Ind L 231, 237-38 (2002). When
the virus was tracked to an individual in the Philippines, he used his citizenship as a shield to
prevent the international community from arresting him on criminal charges; Philippine law
contained no provisions criminalizing computer offenses, and foreign countries found themselves
hard pressed, despite having identified the perpetrator, to press charges in the absence of such a
law. Even with the Sosa decision offering a civil remedy to plaintiffs, issues of collection become
readily apparent; while US courts may declare jurisdiction over an area of the law, the declaration
does not itself guarantee the ability to enforce their judgments against foreign defendants. See
Rho, 7 ChiJ Ind L at 711 (cited in note 21).
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Cody, 11 Mich St U Det Coil LJ Intl L at 238 (cited in note 73).
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The first two scenarios would require only the application of domestic law to the individuals,
while the third scenario more closely parallels the result in the "I Love You" virus incident and
would pose significant challenges to enforcement.
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the proffered solution to all of them.76 The outcome will require that the victim
nation is satisfied with the sanctions legislated by each member country77 and
that appropriate agreements can be worked out with any nonsignatory state to
ensure punishment for members of the group identified and located within its
borders. With such a wide possible range of standards, however, the potential
for the same uncertainty which poses problems for the LOAC analysis reemerges. This uncertainty may be more important to resolve than questions of
distinguishing legal acts of war from illegal criminal acts when they are
committed by nonstate actors. While the Convention thus works well in certain
limited situations, its ability to effectively govern 1W is decidedly unclear, in both
its current form and, to some extent, in a variety of potential permutations.
The US decision to join the Convention on Cybercrime's signatories in
2006,8 despite some assertions that US law may already be comprehensive,79
highlights the unbounded nature of cybercrime and information attacks when
viewed with an eye towards traditional restrictions, particularly geographical and
physical constraints.8 0 If existing US law could independently address these
issues, the move to join the Convention would be unlikely. Signing may then
indicate that even a comprehensive law may not succeed if it only works
domestically, and the decision to sign may be read as an acknowledgement of the
need for international standards. The move may also push towards establishing
the Convention as a customary international norm. Gaining an increased
number of signatories would assist in establishing the Convention as state
practice and would lead towards the conclusion that a legal obligation exists,
satisfying the opinio juris requirement. Looking forward, establishing such a
customary international norm would allow for jurisdiction in US federal courts
and assist in allowing civil actions to be brought against perpetrators.8 '
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Convention on Cybercrime, Preamble
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See id, art 13.
US Department of State, United StatesJoins Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Sept 29, 2006),
available online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/73353.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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4 (cited in note 48).

See Shulman, 37 Colum Transnad L at 952 (cited in note 10).
Rho, 7 Chi J Intl L at 695 (cited in note 21).
See id at 696 for a discussion of Sosa (establishing federal jurisdiction over private suits regardless
of plaintiff and defendant nationality where the violation of customary international norms is
incorporated into federal law by the Alien Tort Statute).
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IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 1O
A. REALISM, INDIVIDUALS, AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The various frameworks offered for a governing law of 1O share the
common feature of relying on a state-based international structure. Proponents
of frameworks based on both international treaties82 and customary international
law have relied on structures characterized by the exclusive participation of
states in developing law. Christiana Ochoa attributes this tendency to the
traditional narrative of international law, in which "states are sovereign, enjoy a
monopoly on legal personality under international law, and make international
law."83 This traditional approach assigns the means of establishing any form of
law exclusively to nations and leaves it to them to determine whether to achieve
this end via international treaties (such as the Convention on Cybercrime) or
more informally. The informal approach of allowing norms to develop,
however, has also typically relied on a state-based approach, incorporating both
the subjective and objective components of state practice and opiniojurisinto its
formation.84
Recent commentary on customary international law formation, however,
has suggested that a realist perspective on this subject requires an analysis of the
role of nonstate actors in the formation process. The underlying principle of this
perspective rests on the idea that those bound by international law ought to have
a voice in its formation.8 5 How completely to democratize the process has been
debated, with some arguing for an inclusion of states, intergovernmental
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs").86 Others have
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See Schmitt, 37 Colum J Transnatl L at 910 (cited in note 7).
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Ochoa, 48 Va J Intl L at 121 (cited in note 5).
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Schmitt, 37 Colurn J Transnad L at 920 (cited in note 7).
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The assertion of the rights of individuals to participate in customary international law formation
dates back to 1967, when McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman noted that while actual inclusion of
every individual would be unrealistic, the recognition of individuals as participating in the
process-as opposed to the view of international law as state-made--could promote more
effective participation by individuals and minimize the "feeling of pawnlike political impotence"
that can accompany the more traditional view. See Myres S. McDougal, et al, Theories about
InternationalLaw: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va J Ind L 188, 193-94 (1968). More
recent commentators have taken notice of the expansion of the subjects of international law to
include nonstate entities. As individually enforceable rights and individual obligations have
become more prevalent, the notion that individuals should participate in the process of creating
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152-53, 158 (cited in note 5).
Ochoa, 48 VaJ Ind L at 146-47 (cited in note 5).
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approached NGOs with skepticism, with concerns that NGOs may be overly
politicized.8 7 NGOs may not, therefore, be the best proxies for civil society in
the nonstate-based, participatory process of law formation."
The realist perspective is supported by current practices that reinforce, at
least, its assertion that the process of forming a new governing law for IW by
custom should look beyond state actors. Individuals may now enforce laws
protecting human rights at the national and international level.89 The recent
passage of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a document
designed to help shape the formation of custom and international law by
establishing an international precedent, allows for indigenous groups to selfidentify and to assert their rights.9 ° This document also reflects the work of
states and NGOs, evidencing the possibility of law created outside of an
exclusively state-based framework.9 1 While allowing an NGO to participate may
not appear novel at first, it runs counter to an asserted trend in the traditional
customary international law literature. The traditional approach would stop short
of recognizing nonstate actors' role in law formation and restrict participation
exclusively to states.92
The components of customary international law, moreover-state practice
and opinio juris--do not pose an insurmountable challenge to the idea that
individuals should participate in its formation. By looking at the larger purpose
of the two components, the inclusion of both objective and subjective elements
in this type of law, it becomes clear that individuals can and most likely do
participate in the creation of similar components in the already established law. 3
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Id at 155.
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See United Nations, Press Release, GeneralAssemby Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
Major Step Forward' towards Human Rights for All, Says President, UN Doc GA/10612 (Sept 13,
2007), available online at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.btm>
(visited Apr 5, 2008).
See United Nations, Press Release, Speakers in Permanent Forum Highlight Violations of Raghts of
Indigenous Peoples, During Human Rights Discussion, UN Doc HR/4673 (May 20, 2003), available
online at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/hr4673.doc.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
Ochoa, 48 VaJ Ind L at 138 (cited in note 5).
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For example, courts already look to public opinion to interpret text reasonably and avoid absurd
results, even though public opinion is not a "state-based" creation, but rather an amalgamation of
views of individuals. See id at 175. See also Hari M. Osofsky and Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of
Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 Chi J Intl L 409, 428-31 (2008) for a discussion of
bottom-up lawmaking in the context of climate change.

Summer 2008

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

B. THE "NEW" CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 10
With other areas of law employing versions of the realist perspective on
customary international law formation,94 the potential of this perspective to
assist in developing a governing law for 1O merits evaluation. This analysis will
be limited to the potential for a nonstate-based method of formation to serve as
a structural guide and will not venture into the substance of such a potential
law.9" The possibility of allowing a broader range of voices into the process does
present some potentially significant advantages, including navigating the more
troublesome aspects of the "use of force," developing a law that recognizes the
altered power structures in a networked world, and improving understanding
between developed and emerging nations. Using a nonstate-based process for
customary international law formation could allow the development of norms
that address 1O and CNA apart from the use of force implications96 that struggle
to constrain it at present.9" The inclusion of nonstate voices in the process allows
for the potential of a bottom-up lawmaking process that may identify and
negotiate around factors that private actors value and that nation-states who may
prioritize continuity with UN Charter provisions have ignored.98 Such a process
may also allow for important influences on the technology to be heard: the UN
Working Group on Internet Governance has noted that the multiplicity of
stakeholders in 1O often leads to solutions based on a limited selection of the
important interests, but without the input of all stakeholders.9 9 In addition,
also react to the growing recognition of the need
bottom-up lawmaking would
0
to include all stakeholders.
A particularly large benefit of such a process is the way in which a
nonstate-based formation process could account for the power-shifting
problems that plague ideas about internet governance as discussed above. By
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and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights).
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allowing nonstate actors to participate in the formation of the law, the process
may recognize the balance of power that exists in the governed territory.
Allowing parties to self-identify on grounds beyond nationality addresses two
concerns. First, it recognizes the growing tendency towards cross-border group
formation."' Second, it creates a mechanism for such groups, which might
remain anonymous in a state of the world in which they are disenfranchised, to
identify themselves to other parties. The result of this identification can be both
to increase communication between all interested groups (which could lead to
better adapted and more enforceable laws) and to reduce the costs of identifying
participants in the event of a breach of those norms. Allowing nonstate actors to
participate in the process may also enhance the acceptance of any formed law in
the long-term by incorporating the socio-economic interests of small nonstate
groups or individuals. These interests may also provide closer analogs to the
interests of developing countries and emerging economies than established
states and superpowers are currently able to achieve because established states
represent a different interest set that may not account for the needs of countries
that have not yet become major users of the internet.' 2 Such results will not
necessarily be reciprocal, however, indicating that continued reliance on a statebased approach-even one that involves developing countries-may not bring
forward the concerns of nonstate groups.
Economic reasoning may also offer increased incentives to engage in this
revised understanding of customary international law formation. Forcing states
to interact with emerging nations, international groups, and individuals can
generate an increase in role reversibility. 10 3 By allowing the concerns of smaller
parties from a range of backgrounds, it becomes more likely that parties will be
forced to account for the needs and desires of all because, in a nice symmetry
with the matter discussed, these smaller groups will have equal power to speak
and to improve the understanding larger groups have of their respective
situations. In the case of the internet, such an exchange could lead to
governance that more closely aligns to the possibilities of the technology in areas
including use, capability, and identification. Nation-states may similarly benefit
by gaining the ability to bring information on new technologies into the
discussion, allowing for the law to address technological advances proactively by
providing incentives to innovators to collaborate and to share information. The
interaction is also likely to force participants to articulate concerns, which should
generate clearer norms by forcing increased discussion and reaction to these
apprehensions.
101 Ochoa, 48 VaJ Intl L at 167-68 (cited in note 5).
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There are immediate concerns about the efficacy of such a system,
however. Traditionally, customary international law has evolved over long
periods of time, which has led to some dismissal of its viability as a means for
developing law in this area. 10 4 There are also challenges to its ability to adapt to
the changing technology. Determining which individuals could participate in
developing a governing law may also encounter resistance as a matter of
policy.0 5 The highly accessible nature of the internet could lead to an overly
democratic process, with different parties attempting to assert themselves in the
process. Such an issue raises questions of the establishment of a qualifying body
to determine who may receive a seat at the table. This weeding out process could
be controversial and runs the risk of prematurely stunting the process.
Moreover, there remains the question of whether such a process can fully
address the limitations embodied by existing law, or if such a process, even if
theoretically viable, will be functionally useful. 10 6
Some of these concerns may be overstated. While customary international
law has generally developed over longer periods of time, recent agreements on
such a law to govern outer space have been quickly agreed on and
implemented.' 7 Although the low-entry costs to IW will necessitate a greater
number of participants in developing the law, there seems little reason to believe
that once an agreement is reached, practice and custom could not be more
readily viewed as having coalesced into legally enforceable customary norms. In
fact, the opposite seems more likely. By allowing a greater amount of
participation by affected organizations and individuals, a stronger argument can
be made that any agreement reflects an agreed upon behavioral norm for 1W. As
such, it can be viewed as creating a legal obligation for participants, which
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destructive capabilities; a simple example would be the policy of refusing to negotiate with
terrorists. This reluctance, however, reflects the need for a paradigm shift away from the statebased conception of international law; politicians must recognize that a shift away from statebased law will involve affording privileges to groups that previously would not have received
them.
Such a process will require high levels of cooperation and interaction on an international level; it
is unclear whether these levels can be achieved and maintained.
Cody, 11 Mich St U Det Coil L J Intl L at 246 (cited in note 73). See also Hugo Caminos and
Michael R. Molitor, Progressive Development of InternationalLaw and the Package Deal, 79 American J
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juis when evaluating the validity of customary international law) (citing Ian Sinclair, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 22 (Manchester 2d ed 1984)); Jacob M. Harper, Development,
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under the Public and Customary InternationalLaws of Space, 8 Chi J Intl L 681, 690-91 (2008) for a
discussion of the role of "instant custom" in customary international law.
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should lead to a more rapid acknowledgement of its role as customary
international law.
Concerns regarding the potentially large number of participants should also
not be deemed prohibitive without further analysis of whether a more inclusive
process will really attract too many participants or if the nature of the concerns
will serve as an effective filter that leads to only greatly affected organizations
participating. These concerns are largely based on ideas of transaction costs,
which increase with the number of participants. At the same time, however, the
increase seems likely to force groups and individuals with only limited interest in
the outcomes of the discussions to entrust them to stakeholders with higher
levels of concern. As such, the fear that such a method will lead to an
unmanageably large number of participants with completely prohibitive costs
will potentially be self-addressing, leading to a discussion group with concrete
stakes in the outcome.
V. CONCLUSION
The reality of 10 accessibility, and the variety of IW capabilities, makes a
governing law for I0 a necessity. This Development stops short of suggesting
the goals or substance of such a law, but recognizes that whatever those goals
may be, existing law seems unable to cope with the potential harms presented by
10. Existing law also seems resistant to ready adoption and application in the
sphere of 1O, and a thorough re-evaluative process is required in determining
new law. The nature of cyberspace itself further complicates the process by
offering a realm that challenges traditional notions of power and requires an
acceptance of previously undreamt global equality. At the same time, the
emergence of a realist view of customary international law formation that
advocates the role of individuals in developing laws presents a possible method
which has distinct benefits and restrictions. This view merits further study to
determine whether or not a policy recommendation can be made regarding its
viability as a tool for developing the substance of a new law.
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